4 As for the proceedings against the EU before the WTO initiated by the U.S. see: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/ cases_e/ds291_e.htm. 6 As for the plans of several Member States to introduce a special safeguard clause for regions see: www.gmo-free-regions.org.
7 Apart from that the draft Act also contains a ban on the use of transgenic animals for breeding purposes as well as the release of transgenic animals especially for the purposes of hunting and fishing. As for the national rules in detail see contested Commission Decision, supra note 5, paras. 18-23. 
III. Infringement of the right to be heard
Regarding the procedural aspects the applicants complained that the Commission had not given them the opportunity to state their views beforeadopting the contested decision. This led the Court to state more precisely the law of procedure governing derogations from harmonisation measures. 
Procedural aspects of Article 95 of the EC Treaty
Up to now, the Court of Justice had only ruled that the right to be heard does not apply as far as requests for derogation under Article 95(4) of the EC Treaty are concerned, 26 but as, in this case, the derogation was based on Article 95(5) EC the applicants asserted that the circumstances called for a different answer. The difference between paras. 4 und 5 is that the first one relates to national provisions already in force before the adoption of the harmonisation measure whilst the latter applies to draft laws envisaged after the adoption of such measures. 27 But as both procedures are initiated by the Member State it is in both cases free to comment on the decision it asks to have adopted. So in this respect the considerations which led the ECJ not to grant another opportunity to be heard in the case of Article 95(4) of the EC Treaty would indeed also be true for Article 95(5).
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But there are other aspects which demand a different view. As the 'para. 4-procedure' applies to provisions already in force, there is a need for a quick resolution as the functioning of the internal market is at stake. The fact that a Member State in case of Article 95(4) is not authorised to apply the notified provisions until after it has obtained Commission approval 29 does not call for different answer. Provisions already in force which only may not be applied pose a more serious threat to the internal market than draft laws that have no legal effect yet, as in the case of the 'para. 5-procedure'. Therefore, if the period in Article 95(6) is extended to enable another hearing or at least a submission in writing, the only effect is that the envisaged law cannot be adopted. This may be detrimental to the Member State that has submitted the request, but not to the internal market. As the Member State is at liberty to accept this limbo situation or not, the consideration of the Court, that a short period in which the request should be resolved would also be in the interest of the requesting Member State 30 is not comprehensible.
Modifications due to the involvement of the EFSA
Even less convincing is the argument the Court employed to refuse the applicant the opportunity to rebut the EFSA opinion. 31 The Commission
Decision was almost entirely prejudiced by this agency. As the Commission sought the EFSA expert report due to the 'complexity of the matter', the logical step to take would have been to extend the decision period as provided for in subparagraph Article 95(6) of the EC Treaty thus giving both the 
IV. Assessment of merits
The conditions set out in Article 95 (5) and (6) 
Problem specific to Austria
Following the EFSA's assessment both the Commission and the Court held that Upper Austria had no unusual or unique ecosystems that required separate risk assessments or other precautionary measures. This finding is surprising since Upper Austria is part of the Alpine Region, an area whose unique value in terms of biodiversity is undisputed by biologists. As this unique ecosystem is very susceptible to external impacts, in 1991 the States of the Alpine Regions agreed on the 'Convention for the Protection of the Alps'. In its preface, the contracting parties declare that they are aware of this region's 'outstanding unique and diverse natural habitat'. The general obligations in Article 2(2)(f)-(h) of the Convention explicitly address the conservation of ecosystems, environmentally compatible mountain farming and forestry and the European Community ratified this Convention in 1996. 51 It seems contradictory to acknowledge, on the one hand, the unique value of this region in terms of its biodiversity by signing the Convention and, on the other hand, to deny it a specific status within the meaning of Article 95(5) of the EC Treaty. Therefore, the failure to recognise Upper Austria's unique ecosystem and the above mentioned 52 lack of competence of the EFSA in assessing those questions led to a substantively flawed decision by the Commission.
Disguised restriction on trade
So contrary to the findings of the Court it appears that the conditions of Article 95(5) of the EC Treaty were indeed met. But as any exceptions to the principles of the uniform application of Community law and the internal market must be strictly interpreted, this did not necessarily mean that the notified provisions had to be approved. 
V. Conclusion
Even though the reasonings on both procedural and substantive aspects seem to be flawed, the result of the judgment of the Court cannot be disputed. The Upper Austrian draft law banning GMOs went far beyond the scope necessary to protect organic/convential farming and biodiversity. A blanket ban without any consideration of the individual GMO product involved thwarts the legal position of those companies that have obtained the right to market their goods under Directive 2001/18. 63 On the other hand, even comprehensive bans on different GMO products may be legal, if for each single one the need for a ban under the special circumstances of the region concerned can be established. So 'through the backdoor' at the least, something coming close to a GMO-free region still seems possible. 64 
